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This paper examines the relationship between input sector liberalization and product 
quality innovation and export orientation by a LDC firm given the complementarity 
between high input quality and high product quality. We show that input sector 
liberalization per se may not induce quality innovation and outward orientation. In 
fact in some situations ceteris paribus input sector liberalization may increase the odds 
in favour of low quality production. We show that total output sector liberalization, or 
surprisingly, a suitable degree of output sector protection then is needed to be 
combined with input sector liberalization so that quality innovation is induced.  
  
JEL Classification: L1, D43. 
 


























  2 1.INTRODUCTION: 
         This paper examines the impact of input-trade liberalization on innovation of 
high-quality final good by a producer in a typical developing country.  Poor quality of 
products in the developing countries often adversely affects their export growths 
particularly in the advanced industrialized countries. Mostly such poor quality can be 
attributed to inferior technology of the domestic firms. Immediately the question that 
crops up is why these firms lack the incentive for quality innovation. The major 
argument of course is that high tariff on the import of final good raises the 
profitability of the domestic market relative to the world market in such a way that it 
lowers the incentive for outward orientation and therefore for quality innovation 
[Acharyya (1995), Desai (1980), Lall (1984)].  
     A closely related argument which more often appear in the informal discussions on 
liberal trade policies as a development strategy is that high tariff on better quality 
foreign input induces the domestic producers to use poor quality indigenous inputs, 
which in turn causes the quality of the final good fall well below the international 
standards. But though there is some evidence on the differences in quality of inputs 
that are available domestically and abroad, it is not clear whether input trade 
liberalization per se provides sufficient impetus for innovation of the high-quality 
product. For example, Premachandra and Rajapatirana (1998), in their study of the Sri 
Lankan liberalization experience point out that “liberalization of imports increased 
access to better quality and cheaper intermediate inputs, reducing the reliance on state 
owned enterprises, which had provided high-cost, low-quality inputs before the 
liberalization”. On the other hand, a study commissioned by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry India, executed by ICRA Advisory Services and Frost and 
Sullivan, show that poor quality output of the Indian Textile industry is caused to a 
  3 large extent by low-quality domestic inputs (Business Line, Internet Edition, August 
17, 2002).  
    But these piecemeal studies do not suggest that availability of high-quality foreign 
input through trade liberalization would necessarily help enhancing quality of final 
products in these cases. The primary reason for such doubts, which in fact motivates 
the present paper, is the lack of technical know-how required to combine the essential 
high-quality sophisticated foreign input with other local factors for producing the 
high-quality variety of the final good. This is best exemplified by the Indian 
experience. The design and production of telecom switches in India by C-Dot require 
import of the Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICS) from Motorola. But 
for better performance and functioning of these switches application specific software 
had to be developed
1. This raises the following issue: Does input-trade liberalization 
always induce the domestic producers to innovate the required technology for 
producing the high-quality final good by using the foreign input?  If there are 
instances where it has influenced the decision for innovation and enhancement of 
quality of the final good, can those be regarded as a general phenomenon? 
   But  whatever  little  evidence  can  be  gathered on the link between input-trade 
liberalization and R&D efforts, does not help us help us answer these questions in a 
very conclusive way. From mid 1980s many developing countries had started 
lowering the average tariff rates and liberalized their trade policies. During 1991-1996 
Bangladesh lowered its average tariff from 88.6% to 27.4%, India from 79.2% to 
38.7%, Malaysia from 16.9% to 8.7% and Thailand from 37.8% to 20%. But the R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP for some of them (such as Bangladesh, Korea and 
Mexico) has increased only marginally (see Table-1) whereas those in Chile, 
                                                            
1 Even import of foreign technology in power sector in India required training of local labour force by 
foreign technicians and skilled personnel. 
  4 Malaysia and Thailand show declining trends. On the other hand, it is evident from 
Table-2 that the share of high technology exports in manufacturing exports, which is a 
first hand indicator of share of high-quality exports in the export basket, has increased 
only for countries like India, China, Malaysia and Korea whereas it has predominantly 
decreased for Bangladesh, Pakistan, Uganda. Majority of the countries show a 
fluctuating trend in high technology exports. 
   The existing theoretical literature also has almost nothing to offer. While there has 
been quite a few theoretical works that examine the effect of output sector protection 
(or liberalization) on the quality choice of firms, surprisingly there is hardly any such 
theoretical formulation that sets out how input protection might affect the quality 
innovation decision of firms
2.  
    This  paper  attempts  to  bridge  this theoretical gap. More precisely, we address 
following two sets of issues. First, does reduction of input tariff always raise the 
incentive for quality innovation? Second, when such input sector liberalization by 
itself does not induce quality innovation, do we need to combine it with output sector 
liberalization?  
   Using a simple micro-theoretic framework, first of all, we show that input sector 
liberalization per se may not induce quality innovation. In fact in some situations 
ceteris paribus input sector liberalization may increase the odds in favour of low 
quality production. More precisely, when there is a non-prohibitive tariff on final 
imports, full liberalization of input sector does not necessarily lead to quality 
innovation. Either total output sector liberalization, or a suitable degree of output 
                                                            
2 The theoretical literature on the impact of liberalization of trade in final good on product quality 
include notable contributions by Clemenz (1991), Herguera and Lutz (1998), Herguera, Kujal and 
Petrakis (2002) and Vandenbussche and Wauthy (2001). There is also a closely related literature on 
technology diffusion from North to the South [Coe and Helpman (1995), by Keller (1998) and Young 
(1991)]. For an excellent survey see Keller (2001). Also empirical studies by Aw and Roberts(1986) 
and Feenstra (1998) examine trade policy effects on quality choices by firms. 
  5 sector protection is needed to be combined with input sector liberalization to induce 
the domestic firm to invest in a quality-improving R&D. But, with a prohibitive tariff 
on final imports, even partial input sector liberalization may be ‘sufficient’ for quality 
innovation for some low R&D expenditures.  
    Input sector liberalization does not just mean lowering of tariffs on inputs. Many 
physical restrictions on imports are also in place in the developing countries. To 
examine how far relaxations of such restrictions can induce quality innovation, we 
recast our analysis in an initial situation where there is a ratio-quota in place. That is 
the final good firm is required to purchase a certain proportion of its input 
requirement from the local suppliers and the ad-valorem tariff on low-quality final 
import that is granted is conditional upon meeting this requirement. This regime is 
essentially the content protection scheme discussed by Corden (1971). Under these 
circumstances we check the sufficiency of output sector liberalization vis-à-vis input 
sector liberalization in inducing product-quality innovation. Under such 
circumstances the output sector liberalization per se induces product-quality 
innovation whereas uniform input sector liberalization per se may not, once again, 
induce product-quality innovation. Although one may point out that this content 
requirement violates WTO norms, we find this analysis useful because it conveys the 
crux of the matter well. 
    All these results have some obvious implications for sequencing of input sector and 
output sector liberalization in the context of liberalization policy as an instrument of 
innovation. 
      The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized a s  f o l l o w s .  I n  s e c tion-2 we describe the 
structure of the model and the tariff regimes. In section-3 we examine the innovation 
decision (quality innovation) of the final-good firm under trade liberalization.  Section 
  6 3.1 considers input sector liberalization and Section 3.2 discusses implications of 
output sector liberalization. In section-.3.3 we consider physical restrictions on import 
of foreign input and re-examine the above mentioned issues. Finally section-4 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.THE MODEL: 
Given the perspective as spelled out above, consider a market for a final good X in a 
developing country, where a single domestic producer operates
3. Given the world 
technology, the final good can be of two types: low-quality (L) and high-quality (H). 
These are the two varieties that are available in the world market. But whereas the 
domestic firm can produce the low-quality good at constant marginal cost (henceforth 
MC) and zero fixed cost, it cannot produce the high-quality variety. An essential input 
(I) for producing the final good X that is available in the perfectly competitive 
domestic input sector is of very poor quality compared to the variety that is available 
in the competitive world market for the input. Moreover, even if the domestic firm is 
allowed by the local government to import the high-quality foreign input at duty-free 
world price, it simply does not have the technical know-how to combine such foreign 
input with other local factors of production to produce the high-quality variety.  The 
domestic firm thus must invest in an R&D to develop the technology to use the 
foreign input to produce the high-quality variety
4. Thus, whereas the low-quality 
domestic input cannot be used to produce the high-quality final good, the high-quality 
input imported from abroad, though essential, but does not per se improve the quality 
                                                            
3 The results derive below do not change qualitatively if there are more domestic firms who compete in 
Cournot fashion. Assumption of a single domestic firm is just a simplification. 
4 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, if we allow foreign investment, the high-quality final good 
can be produced by the subsidiary unit without further investment in R&D as it can access to the same 
technology as used by the parent firm. However, to focus on how input-tariff reduction improves 
product-quality innovation we abstract from this issue. 
  7 of the final good. These assumptions, though may seem restrictive, capture the actual 
technological situations prevailing in the developing countries as mentioned earlier
5.  
    The difference in the quality of domestic and foreign input has another implication 
in this paper: difference in their productivity in producing the low-quality variety of 
the final good. Whereas the low-quality indigenous input has a low marginal product 
i.e. a high input-output ratio γ , the high-quality foreign input has a high marginal 
product and thus a low input-output ratio 
−
γ . This means, if the domestic final-good 
producing firm does not innovate, then the only benefit from using the foreign input is 
a reduction of the MC of output of the low-quality variety.  Moreover, for analytical 
convenience we assume that once the required technology to produce high-quality 
input is developed through R&D, amount of the foreign input (per unit output) needed 
to produce the high-quality variety of the final good is the same as is needed to 
produce the low-quality output. 
                 Let the constant MC of producing the low-quality domestic input be cI and 
the high-quality foreign input be cI* and for simplicity we assume cI = cI* implying 
that the domestic input price PI = cI = cI*
6. The high-quality foreign input market is 
assumed to be perfectly competitive so that PI* = cI*. This coupled with the previous 
assumption imply that PI = cI  = cI*= PI*. Indeed this assumption is made for 
simplicity. All we need is that the MC of output while using the foreign input should 
be less than the MC of output when domestic input is used. Thus the marginal cost of 
output for the final-good firm using the home input is cIγ  and the foreign input is c = 
                                                            
5 This of course raises the issue why such differences persist at all? That is, what prevents the domestic 
input producers to invest in input-quality improving R&D. Part of the reason once again is the high 
protection offered to the domestic input sectors by the governments in the developing countries.  
6 Although the production of foreign high quality input should have a higher MC i.e. cI* > cI , we can 
assume that the foreign input producers  have a better technology and thus can produce inputs at a 
lower MC such that cI* =cI . 
  8 PI*
−
γ  = cI
−
γ . With the home country government imposing an input tariff tI on the 





               (1+ tI) PI* = (1+ tI) cI                                                                                  (1) 
Consequently, MC of output for the final-good firm equals c = (1+ tI) PI*
−
γ  = (1+ tI) 
cI
−
γ .  
That is the break-even input tariff should be such that  
         (1+ tI) cI
−
γ  = cIγ .                                                                                                (2) 
In other words the domestic input firms break-even for, 






.                                                                                                   (3) 
Thus only for tI   the domestic input industry makes non-negative profit and 
operates. We assume that the initial input tariff is set at  . Let c be the 







   i.e.            = ( 1+ t ) c I ˆ I
−
γ   ∀    t                                                                  (4)   ≤ I ˆ
0
I t
When     = c I tˆ
0 c ˆ Iγ . Interestingly below  the output firm will start to import the 
high-quality input from abroad as the constant MC of output is lower in that case and 
the domestic input firms will shut down.  
0
I t
                 Let us now turn to the final-good sector. We assume that there is no tariff 
on the high quality good, i.e. the high quality good sector is completely open to 
foreign competition. The implication of this assumption is that after successful quality 
innovation the domestic firm has the incentive to sell the high quality product in the 
domestic market as well as in the world market (export market) that in other words is 
the integrated world market. The pre-innovative integrated world market (henceforth 
  9 world market) for the high quality good is characterized in the following way. For 
simplicity we assume that there are two firms
7 in the world market selling the high 
quality product competing in quantities. The assumption of quantity competition is 
made to ensure a positive rent from producing the high quality product (in the world 
market). Otherwise there will be no incentive for quality up-gradation and the entire 
analysis becomes trivial and uninteresting.  One important comment is warranted at 
this point. We assume that after successful quality innovation the domestic firm will 
switch over totally to high quality production. (It may also operate as a multi-product 
firm producing both low and high quality good in the domestic market but that will 
not change the analysis much). After successful quality innovation (if the domestic 
firm decides to undertake it at all), it will compete with these foreign firms in the 
world market and there will be a three firm cournot oligopoly in the world market. 
Again for the sake of simplicity we assume that firms are symmetric. On the other 
hand, import of the low-quality final good is subject to a non-prohibitive ad-valorem 
tariff t. With world market for low quality good perfectly competitive this means, 
                                                                                            (5)  () ()
−
+ = + = I L L c t P t P 1 * 1 γ
                                                          
Protection granted only to the low-quality production is not at odds with reality. In 
India, for example, quantitative restrictions on almost all import items have been 
dismantled. Tariff rates have also been slashed from April 2001. But quality 
regulations are imposed by which goods of lower qualities are not allowed to be 
imported. Imports of automobiles from Japan in Bangladesh face similar quality 
regulations by which refurbished cars that are more than five years old are prohibited 
to be imported. There are other examples as well. European Union applies higher 
tariff on the imports of low-quality wheat to high-quality wheat. Also very recently 
 
7 The model goes through with any finite number of firms. 
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duty on low-quality imports is still in place. We capture these restrictions in terms of 
tariff on imports of low-quality goods. 
Suppose the domestic demand function for the low-quality good is linear:  
              PL = a  - XL.                                                                                                    (6) 
and the integrated world demand for the high-quality good is: 
              PH = a  – X ′ H                                                                                                  (7) 
We assume that a > 4a implying that the integrated world market for high-quality 
good is sufficiently greater than the domestic market for the low quality good. The 
reason for this assumption will be made clear later. 
′
Given the ad-valorem tariff on the low-quality foreign good, the domestic monopolist 
can charge a price equal to (1+ t )PL*  but no more than that in the domestic market. If 
such a price covers its MC of producing the low quality good by using the indigenous 
input,    as defined in (2), the firm will produce and given constant MC, will supply 
the entire demand at that price.  
c ˆ
That is for any given t, output produced by the home monopolist is, 
              XL = a – (1 + t) cI
−
γ .                                                                                       (8) 
and the corresponding profit is   
            π ( , t) = [ ( 1 + t ) P c ˆ L*  –c] [ a - ( 1 + t ) P ˆ L* ] . 
                         =  (t - t ) {a – (1+ t)c }                                                             (9) 
−
γ I c I ˆ
−
γ I
From (9) we obtain restriction on the tariff on low-quality product that induces the 
domestic firm to produce as: 
                    t  ≥ t                                                                                                     (10)   I ˆ
  11This endogeneity of the final-good tariff, i.e. the link between extent of protections 
offered to the final-good and the input producing domestic firms, is quite obvious to 
those familiar with the literature on effective rate of protection and content protection 
scheme [ Corden (1971) ].  
In particular, the government intending to protect the low-quality final-good 
producing firm(s) must take into account the input protection that it has granted and 
while setting the tariff on final good it must satisfy (9). More generally, t should be set 
as,  
      t = f (t )  where    > 0 .                                                                                (11)  I ˆ () I t f ˆ ′
It is straightforward to check that π (c, t) will be a positively sloped concave function 
reaching a maximum at the prohibitive tariff 
ˆ









c c t a
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ˆ
 and becomes 
horizontal thereafter. That is for t > t  the firm can earn a monopoly profit   
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. Accordingly, domestic 
price, output and profit will remain invariant with respect to change in the tariff rate 







, implying that as the fixed input tariff is 
increased the prohibitive output tariff must also increase. This is quite intuitive as the 
monopoly price that corresponds to prohibitive tariff varies positively with the MC, 
, and by (4) that depends on the input-tariff. But before we proceed further note that  c ˆ
  12if the local government had set the tariff on the low-quality final good imports to 
maximize national welfare, then it would choose the same rate as the input tariff rate: 
Lemma1: Given any input tariff t , the welfare maximizing low quality output 
tariff is equal to the input tariff. That is  . 
I ˆ
I t t ˆ * =
Proof: The total domestic welfare from low quality production is the sum of total 
consumer surplus from low quality consumption and the domestic monopolists profit. 
The total consumer surplus is defined as CS = and the total producers 
surplus is given in equation (9). Maximizing W = CS + π ( , t) with respect to ‘t’ and 


















. This completes the proof. 
Note that at this optimum tariff on low quality imports, profit of the domestic output 
firm falls to zero. This essentially reflects the conflict between welfare-maximizing 
and protective targets of tariff setting in this model. Thus in this set up if the 
government intends to protect the domestic industry, it should set a sub-optimal 
output tariff above the optimum tariff  . Since, here our purpose is to examine the 
link between protection and quality innovation we assume that government choose the 
tariff rate from the set 
I tˆ
() .  t tI, ˆ
      Let us now turn to the firm’s decision to innovate and produce the high-quality 
good given the above mentioned tariff regimes. 
 
3. QUALITY INNOVATION: 
           In  this  section  we  examine the decision to produce the high-quality good 
starting with the ad-valorem input tariff,  = , the ad-valorem tariff on the low- I tˆ
0
I t
  13quality good,  ( , ∈ t I tˆ t ] and no tariff on the high-quality good. Our aim here is to 
derive the relation between input sector liberalization and product quality innovation. 
Given the non-prohibitive input tariff, t , the output firm can purchase the high-
quality input necessary for product-quality innovation from abroad at a price 
0
I
( ) I I c t
0 1+
()
. But this is not sufficient. It must develop the technology to produce the 
high-quality good as well through R&D which involves a fixed cost, Fq. Suppose 
innovation outcome is certain. Of course this is only a simplifying assumption. Then 
after product quality up-gradation the domestic firm will sell the high quality product 
in the integrated world market. As mentioned previously the domestic final-good firm 
can earn a three firm symmetric Cournot oligopoly profit  
()
16
1 I t +
π
                                                          
0 c



















−                                                                    (13) 
in the world market if it decides to innovate
8. However, it does so only if,  
      π                                                                                                (14)  ) Fq −
The RHS is the profit that the final-good firm earns from selling the low-quality good 
in the domestic market, whereas LHS is the net profit from selling the high-quality 
good in the world market. That is, quality innovation must be relatively profitable. 
The tie-breaking rule applied here is that for strict equality, the output firm prefers 
quality-innovation.  
Before proceeding further we want to state the following lemma and derive some of 
the important threshold values for the quality innovation cost  .   q F
 
8 Note that the input tariff inclusive MC of output is  γ I c since high-quality production requires the 
high quality input, that could only be purchased by paying the tariff inclusive price. (See equation (1)). 
Thus the profit function of the domestic firm for high-quality product depends on γ . 
  14 Lemma 2: The output firm innovates product quality for any tariff on low-quality 
final imports, prohibitive or non-prohibitive, iff 
                    =  q F ≤ q F ˆ () {} [] γ γ I I c a a c a a 3 2 2
16
1
− + ′ + − ′  















 + + − ′
− −
γ γ I I I c t a a c t a a ˆ 1 3 2 1 2
16
1
 ∀      
0 ˆ
I I t t ≤
                                                                                                                                   (15)                               
Proof: The final-good firm would prefer producing the high-quality good irrespective 
of the level of t when, 
      π  π ( ) = π   () max ≥ − q F Q t c, ˆ () c m ˆ
Since πm (Q) is invariant w.r.t. tariff on low quality final good (t) and π (c ) is 
monotonic upto 
t , ˆ
t and remains constant thereafter. Using (12) and (13) this condition 
boils down to (15). Hence the claim. 
      What emerges from above is that for “small” R&D costs in the sense defined in 
(15), quality innovation always takes place. Moreover, this is the case as long as input 
tariff is non-prohibitive, no matter how large or small it may be. Also when t  we 



















 for which quality innovation is 
viable. Combining the two we get a range of   for which we can explore some non-
trivial results. 
 
3.1. INPUT-SECTOR LIBERALIZATION: 
            To examine the effect of input sector liberalization let us first consider the 
relationship between innovation decision and input-tariff, given the ad-valorem tariff 
  15on low-quality final import. Let us begin with non-prohibitive output tariff   on final 
imports and input tariff at t . Suppose for some 
0 t
0
I [ ] * , ˆ 0
q q q F F F ∈ , the initial tariff 
regimes were just conducive for product-quality innovation. Recalling the innovation 
decision from (14), the following must therefore be true: 





I I I F
c a











γ γ γ  .                                             (16) 
where t0 denotes the initial tariff on low-quality final imports. Such an initial position 
is indicated by point B in Fig-1.  
FIGURE-1 GOES HERE 
When  is reduced keeping t I tˆ 0 fixed, the profits from low-quality and high-quality 
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 .                                                                                                          (17c) 
where   is the net profit from quality innovation. Thus, given t  and 
, we were initially at point B. When t  is reduced successively, the profit from sale 
of low-quality good increases at a constant rate as shown by the straight line, whereas 
the quality innovation profit increases at an increasing rate as indicated by the convex 
curve(s). Consequently, three possibilities emerge depending upon the parametric 
values. One is the case where   curve lies wholly below the π  curve for all 
. In such a case input sector liberalization cannot induce quality innovation. 









) (Q ∏ ) , ˆ ( t c
0 [ ∈
  16The other extreme case is the one where π  curve lies wholly below ∏  curve 
implying input-sector liberalization, however small it may be, induces product-quality 
innovation. Finally, the intermediate case indicates a minimum dose of input-sector 
liberalization will induce product quality up-gradation. Of course, in these two cases, 
if   for sufficiently high  , input-sector liberalization by itself may not 
induce quality innovation similar to the first possibility.  




























We compare the intercepts of both   and π  curves when   given   
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.                            (18) 
From (18) what we get is that if the cost advantage while producing the high-quality 
good exceeds the cost advantage while producing the low-quality good due to a 
reduction in input tariff then product-quality innovation will take place at t  as is 
explained by the last two cases, otherwise product-quality innovation will not take 
place at  as is shown by the ∏  curve lying wholly below π  curve. The 
reason behind this kind of result is the higher productivity of high-quality input in 
both high-quality and low quality production. If high quality inputs are purchased 
duty free they can be used in the production of low quality goods thus reducing its 
unit cost of production. If this total cost advantage of using high quality input in low 
quality production exceeds the cost advantage while producing the high quality 
products, producers will start producing low-quality goods using high quality inputs.  
0 ) , ˆ (c
Therefore we get the following result: 
  17Proposition 1:  Given the non-prohibitive tariff on final imports, input-sector 
liberalization per se may not induce product-quality innovation for  [ ] * , ˆ
q q q F F F ∈ . 
Proof: Follows from the above discussion and Figure-1. 
 
Another way of interpreting the above result is that when input tariff is reduced 
without tinkering the output sector, effective rate of output sector protection increases. 
So in essence input sector liberalization per se may serve as a protective device for the 
low-quality output sector. This again is mainly due to the cost effectiveness of the 
high-quality input in both low-quality and high-quality production. 
           Interestingly,  suppose  we take the case where product-quality innovation 
doesn’t take place when input tariff is reduced. In this case if tariff on low quality 
imports (henceforth ‘t’) is reduced then the cost advantage from producing the low-
quality good increases! That is if input sector liberalization is supplemented by a 
partial output sector liberalization quality innovation becomes relatively less 
profitable. The intuition behind this kind of a paradoxical finding is as follows: If ‘t’ 
is reduced, the domestic low-quality producer being a restricted monopolist in the 
domestic low-quality good market, will have to reduce its price (limit price) to deter 
foreign entry. This fall in price will lead to increased domestic demand in for the low 
quality good. Thus the total cost advantage of using the high-quality input in low-
quality production gets magnified due to this expanded market coverage. This can 
also be seen from the relative slopes of both the curves, where the slope of   is 
independent of ‘t’ [see eqn. (17b)], the absolute slope of π  increases with a 
reduction in ‘t’ [see eqn. (17a)]. Thus a reduction in ‘t’ makes product-quality 
innovation relatively unprofitable. So in this situation there are two ways to induce 
quality innovation. One is to open up the low-quality output sector totally i.e. setting 
) (Q ∏
) , ˆ ( t c
  18t=0 (this liberalization of the input sector and the output sector together is the big-
bang approach) or increase protection in the low-quality good sector, i.e. raise ‘t’ so 
that product-quality innovation is induced. Setting t=0 will integrate the domestic 
low-quality with the rest of the world. Given that the world market of the low quality 
good is perfectly competitive the domestic low quality producer’s profit falls to zero. 
The domestic producer will then have no other choice but to innovate and upgrade its 
product quality. On the other hand increased protection on the low quality good will 
lead to a rise in price of that good in the domestic market leading to reduced market 
coverage. This leads to a fall in the total cost advantage of input sector liberalization 
on low quality production. Hence increased protection on the low quality good 
increases the odds in favour of quality up-gradation. Therefore we state the following 
result: 
Proposition 2:  
(a) Total input sector liberalization may have to be supplemented by total output 
sector liberalization or by a suitable degree of output sector protection to 
induce product-quality innovation.  
(b) The first policy-combination leads to greater social welfare.  
Proof:  
(a) Follows from the above discussion and equations (17a), (17b) and 18. 
(b) Follows directly from Lemma-1 and the fact that high quality production 
generates higher profit and higher consumer surplus. 
         
This result can be used as a possible explanation of why some countries experienced 
increase in R&D expenditure and others did not during the process of globalization. It 
is interesting to note that input sector liberalization coupled with a suitable output 
  19sector protection gives a democratic government an additional policy tool to push 
forward the reform process with the desired outcome.  Thus a democratic government 
facing problems in implementing a big-bang reform program may take this 
gradualistic route that too without much political fuss. Since we do not explicitly 
focus on this issue we leave the matter over here. 
                 The previous analysis is carried out based on a particular value of   such 
that the domestic producer is indifferent between quality innovation and no 
innovation (i.e. ).  But we must mention that the position of ∏  depend on 
the value of   implying that if we do not restrict   then there can exist a possibility 
that for high and low input tariff ranges quality innovation is optimal and for the 
intermediate range low quality production is optimal given any non-prohibitive tariff t 
=   on low-quality imports
q F
0
q q F F = () Q
q F q F
0 t
9. This is illustrated in Figure-2.  
FIGURE-2 GOES HERE 
Depending on the values of the parameters we get three cases.   can lie wholly 
above π . In this situation there is no input tariff for which low-quality production 
takes place. This is the trivial case where high-quality production takes place for all 
input tariff  . But note that an output sector liberalization i.e. a reduction in 
‘t’ can play a spoilsport since π  becomes steeper and we can end up having low-
quality production dominating high-quality production for some input tariff ranges. 
 can intersect π  only once. The third and most interesting situation is 











[ 1 , 0 t ∈
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( t c,
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[ ] 0 ,t
~ ~ t t I I ∈  and sufficiently low input tariffs  [ ] I I t ~ , 0 ∈ t  high-quality production 
                                                            
9 The mathematical calculations can be obtained from the authors on request. 
 
  20will take place and in the intermediate range low-quality production takes place. Thus 
high input sector protection or a high degree of input sector liberalization will induce 
quality innovation. The curvature properties of both the functions should be such that 
they intersect twice and this will obviously depend on the parameters of the model. 
Suppose  [ ] I I I t t t
~ ~ , ~ ∈
()
. Within this tariff range high-quality production will not take 
place. Now a decrease in ‘t’ will again increase the range of t  for which low-quality 
production holds. Again an increase in t will make high-quality production relatively 
profitable. Thus in this general structure also we can show that an input sector 
liberalization per se may not induce high-quality production. We may need to 














           What happens if there is prohibitive tariff on the low-quality final product? 
Under prohibitive tariff on low-quality final imports, “gross” relative profit from 
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given  . Thus, from lemma-2 we get is that quality innovation is relatively 
profitable for all 
a′
[ ] q F ˆ , 0 ∈  where,   is as defined in (15) irrespective of the degree 
of protection in the low-quality output sector, given a particular t . 
q F ˆ
I ˆ
But once again, the non-trivial case is when  . It is evident from (15) that   is 
a function of t with 











 given  . This is shown in Figure-3.   a a 4 > ′
  21FIGURE-3 GOES HERE 
This function gives different combinations of   and t  for which quality innovation 
will just take place, i.e. the maximum tolerance limit of   for different t  values, 
given prohibitive tariff on low-quality final imports. It is evident that for larger dose 











q may be, there always exists an input tariff that is conducive to product quality 
innovation? Certainly not. In particular when  ,   =   where   0
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This leads us to the following proposition:  
Proposition 3:  
 Given prohibitive tariff on the low-quality output, there exists a suitable degree of 
input sector liberalization sufficient for product-quality innovation ∀ [ ] q q q F F F
~
, ˆ ∈ . 
Proof: Follows from the above discussion and Figure-3. 
             This indicates that for very high R&D costs, input sector liberalization per se 
is not a sufficient condition for product-quality innovation. In that case high-quality 
production can be induced by opening up the low quality output sector completely.  
           Does output sector liberalization per se induce quality innovation? We briefly 




  223.2OUTPUT SECTOR LIBERALIZATION: 
From lemma2 we know that for all  q F [ ] q F ˆ , 0 ∈ , the domestic monopolist will always 
invest in quality- innovating R&D and produce the high-quality good by importing 
the high-quality input for all tariff rates on low-quality final imports, prohibitive or 
non-prohibitive. But if  >   then  q F q F ˆ ( t ) tˆ −  amount of tariff cut is necessary to induce 
the domestic monopolist to produce the high-quality good. It is also evident from 
Figure-4, that the critical ad-valorem tariff on low-quality good,  , varies inversely 
with 
t ˆ
( ) * , ˆ
q q q F F F ∈ . In other words 
             =  (F t ˆ t ˆ q),    t    ∀    0 ˆ < ′ ( ) * , ˆ
q q q F F F ∈ .                                                        (21) 
FIGURE-4 GOES HERE 
This relationship showing the maximum tariff for a given  ( ) * , ˆ
q q q F F F ∈  that is 
conducive to product-quality innovation, is illustrated in Figure-5 as the QQ segment 
which is convex and reaches a minimum at t .  
FIGURE-5 GOES HERE 
Consider a set-up cost such as  . If initially the tariff was  (and correspondingly 
the economy at pt. A), product-quality innovation does not take place. Removing the 
tariff barrier on low-quality final imports fully immediately induces the domestic 
output firm to innovate and switch to the protected domestic market for high-quality 
good. The above analysis is not surprising. But the important point to note is that 
given the nature of the domestic input and the complementarity between high-quality 
input and output, output sector liberalization is anti-protective for the input firm as 
well, despite a fixed non-prohibitive input-tariff. The output sector liberalization 
forces the output firm to buy the high-quality input from abroad necessary for 
0
q F t′
  23product-quality innovation. Consequently, the demand for low-quality input dwindles 
away. Thus  
Lemma 3: Full liberalization or critical degree of liberalization,  ( ) q F t ˆ − t , of the 
output sector causes domestic input firms to shut down regardless of the input-tariff. 
Proof: Follows from the complementarity between high-quality input and output. 
What is to be recognized is that in face of output sector liberalization, input-tariff 
becomes redundant. In such a case, i.e. when t is lowered below  ( ) q F ˆ t , the input tariff 
should be dispensed with as it no longer fulfills the target with which, perhaps, it was 
introduced. The net gain that we can expect in such a case is an increase in domestic 
firm’s profit contingent upon low imported input cost and hence an increase in total 
surplus in the high-quality domestic market and overall welfare thus increases. With 
this we end our terse discussion on output sector liberalization and next we examine 
our results in an alternative input protection scheme. 
 
3.3 RATIO-QUOTA AND QUALITY INNOVATION: 
Consider an alternative input protection regime, where instead of input tariff on 
imported input there is a ratio-quota in place. In particular suppose the final-good firm 
while producing the low-quality good is required to purchase k-proportion of his input 
requirement from the local suppliers and the rest (1-k) proportion is allowed to be 
purchased from the world market. Note that if the ad-valorem tariff on low-quality 
final import that is granted is conditional upon meeting this requirement, the regime is 
essentially the content protection scheme discussed in Corden (1971). Under such 
content requirement scheme we re-examine how trade liberalization affects the choice 
of quality innovation. Now, the average and marginal cost of producing the low-
quality good under this scheme becomes, 
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To fix ideas, suppose there is a prohibitive tariff on low-quality final imports. Hence, 
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In general if we do not assume prohibitive tariff on low-quality final imports, profit 
from selling low-quality good equals,  
               () () 

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 However, given that the high-quality good cannot be produced by indigenous low-
quality input, instead of ratio-quota the government allows all input requirement to be 








I I t t .  Thus the profit from quality innovation is, 










π .                                                                       (24) 
Assume that the value of Fq = Fq
0 (this Fq
0 is different from what we had in (16)) is 
such that, other things remaining the same, for k = 0 producing low-quality is 
profitable and for k = 1 producing high-quality is profitable.  
From the first assumption we get that 
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and from the second we get that  














 .                                                             (26) 
  25Thus, essentially we consider a value of Fq




 ∈ q q q F F F ˆ ˆ , ˆ 0
Now, suppose initially the value of the parameters are such that, 
                     () () t k t L I H , π π< . 
This corresponds to k = k0 in figure-6.  
FIGURE-6 GOES HERE 
Now it is straightforward to check the following effects: 
(1) k is only reduced: Ceteris-paribus if k is reduced we end-up with no-quality 
innovation. This is quite intuitive; as k is reduced the cost of producing the low-
quality good falls making it relatively more profitable. 
(2) t is only reduced: If t is reduced, profit from producing the low-quality good falls 
resulting a downward shift of the π  curve and thus quality innovation 
becomes relatively profitable. So in this case output sector liberalization induces 
product-quality innovation. 
( t k L , )
(3) tI only reduced: If only tI is reduced, profit from producing the high-quality good 
will increase thus making it relatively more profitable. In this case selective input 
sector liberalization induces product-quality innovation.  
(4) Uniform input sector liberalization: Both k and tI reduced: We look at the 
relative responsiveness of the change in profit from low-quality with respect to 
change in k and profit from high-quality with respect to change in tI .  
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  26It is evident from the above expressions that the relative responsiveness [i.e 
movement along π  and the shift of π ] depends on the parametric values 
and thus the outcome of uniform input sector liberalization is ambiguous. This 
reinforces the result that input sector liberalization per se might not induce product-
quality innovation. 
( t k L , ) () I H t
 
4.CONCLUSION:  
                 One  of  the  main  reasons why majority LDC firms are internationally 
uncompetitive is that they do not undertake major innovations and thus the products 
they produce are often of lower quality
10. Given the foreign buyers increasing 
sensitiveness towards quality variations rather than cost reductions, export prospects 
for the developing country firms are becoming limited. The reason often given for this 
predominance of minor innovations in the developing countries is that the domestic 
inputs are often of low quality and thus the developing country firms do not have 
access to high quality intermediates. Given the complementarity between high input 
quality and high product quality one may think that input sector liberalization might 
be an instant success in inducing quality innovation and outward orientation by 
domestic firms. But what we found out was evidently quite interesting and can be 
summarized as follows:  
(a) Input sector liberalization per se may not induce quality innovation. In fact in 
some situations ceteris paribus input sector liberalization may increase the 
odds in favour of low quality production.  
                                                            
10 One peculiar aspect of India’s technological development is that whatever little innovation has taken 
place in these countries is minor innovation including adaptation of processes to indigenous raw 
materials, instead of major innovations at the frontiers of technology (Desai, 1980; Lall, 1984). 
  27(b) Total output sector liberalization, or surprisingly, a suitable degree of output 
sector protection then is needed to be combined with input sector liberalization 
so that quality innovation is induced. We also re-examine our above findings 
in an alternative input protection scenario. 
(c) The first policy prescription generates greater social welfare. 
(d) We also bring out the endogeneity of the final-good tariff, i.e. the link between 
extent of protections offered to the final-good and the input producing 
domestic firms. 
Indeed if the high quality input is cost effective at the same time one has to rethink the 
conventional wisdom of treating input sector liberalization as an instant panacea in 
inducing quality innovation. Lastly we considered an alternative input protection 
scheme and arrived at similar conclusions. 
                 One related but important issue that we didn’t explicitly consider is the 
issue of whether a government, given its political constraints, should adopt a ‘big-
bang’ or a ‘gradualist’ route to trade liberalization. In the context of our paper the 
policy combination of input sector liberalization coupled with a suitable degree of 
output sector protection, gives a democratic government an additional route to achieve 
the desired outcome that too without antagonizing all sections (interest groups) of the 
society (any domestic industry prefers a protected home market to competition)
11. 
Although this policy combination fails to maximize social welfare initially, the 
government can open up the output sector at a later stage and maximize social 
welfare. This dynamic perspective coupled with the issue of lobbying and interest 
groups constitute our future research agenda. 
 
                                                            
11 See Wei (1993) for a related argument. 
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Table-1 
Research and Development Expenditure (% of Gross National Income) 
         
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Bangladesh  .. .. ..  0.01  0.04  0.03  .. 
Brazil  .. .. .. ..  0.82  0.84  0.81 
Chile  ..  ..  ..  0.90 0.83 0.67 0.68 
China  0.68 0.68 0.64 0.75 0.67 0.61 0.61 
Ecuador  ..  ..  ..  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
India  0.80 0.75 0.73 0.77 0.73  ..  .. 
Korea, Rep.  1.88 1.95 2.10 2.32 2.60 2.71 2.82 
Malaysia  .. ..  0.40  0.35  0.24  .. .. 
Mexico  .. .. ..  0.23  0.31  0.33  .. 
Venezuela, RB  0.54  0.49  0.49  .. .. .. .. 
Thailand  0.18  0.16 .. 0.15 .. 0.13  0.13 
 
Source: World Development Indicators.  




High-Technology Exports as Percentage of Manufacturing 
          
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Argentina  8.13 8.03 6.59 4.91 4.10 5.67 5.13 5.96 
China  ..  6.51 7.20 8.33  10.47  12.44  13.14  15.54 
India  4.69 4.05 4.25 4.79 5.81 6.88 6.55 5.62 
Malaysia  38.21 38.94 41.14 44.27 46.14 44.42 49.02 54.92 
Pakistan  0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.12 
Peru  ..  1.63 1.68 2.59 2.55 6.01 4.65 4.09 
South Africa  ..  4.83 4.73 4.88 5.75 5.65 7.53 8.75 
Thailand  20.84 22.05 20.66 23.73 24.55 29.16 30.81 34.43 
Venezuela, RB  1.49 2.20 2.58 2.40 2.72 2.54 2.56 2.62 
Uganda  .. .. ..  10.99  2.11  0.25  ..  4.59 
Bangladesh  0.25 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.08 
Mexico  8.60  11.26 11.61 13.93 15.18 15.82 17.57 19.26 
 
Source: World Development Indicators.  
              2001 CD-ROM, World Bank. 
 
 